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NEW DECISIONS HIGHLIGHT OLD MISGIVINGS: A 
REASSESSMENT OF THE FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST 
IMPROVEMENTS ACT FOLLOWING MINN-CHEM 
Robert D. Sowell* 
Abstract 
What role does the United States play in policing international 
commerce? At what point do the laws of the United States end and 
those of other nations begin? These questions, among others, arise in 
determining when U.S. antitrust laws apply to foreign conduct. Looking 
back, the Sherman Act, for some time, has applied to foreign conduct so 
long as that conduct satisfied certain requirements. However, common 
law tests proved inconsistent and difficult to apply. As a result, ninety-
two years after the enactment of the Sherman Act, Congress intervened 
with the intent to clarify the common law by way of the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). Unfortunately, congressional 
efforts failed. 
Today, as international commerce flourishes and political borders 
figuratively dissipate, the questions become even more difficult. Federal 
courts attempting to apply the FTAIA have labored over the statute’s 
difficult language and structure. The FTAIA bars the Sherman Act from 
applying to foreign conduct involving non-import commerce unless 
such conduct has an effect on domestic commerce and the effect gives 
rise to the plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, the statute distinguishes between 
conduct, effect, and injury. The causal link between each distinction has 
been the subject of much debate. In 2005, the D.C. Circuit required a 
proximate cause relationship between the effect and injury. Similarly, a 
recent decision from the Seventh Circuit required a proximate cause 
nexus between the conduct and effect. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit 
highlighted an error within the D.C. Circuit’s holding. This Note rejects 
the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation and argues that a but-for nexus between 
the effect and injury adheres more correctly to the statute’s text, 
legislative history, and international comity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few legal problems can withstand the test of time and overcome 
both judicial and legislative attempts at clarity. One such problem is the 
extraterritorial1 application of American antitrust laws. Toward the end 
of the nineteenth century, Congress enacted the Sherman Act2 in an 
attempt “to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public 
against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through 
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.”3 Shortly thereafter, 
the question arose: whether and to what extent U.S. antitrust laws 
extended to foreign conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court’s initial 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “extraterritorial” as 
“[b]eyond the geographic limits of a particular jurisdiction”). 
 2. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7). 
 3. Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Canada, 260 U.S. 501, 
512 (1923). 
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determination strictly limited the application of the Sherman Act 
abroad.4 However, subsequent case law muddied the waters. Indeed, 
common law rules ranged from Judge Learned Hand’s “intended-
effects” test in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)5 to 
the balancing tests of the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals6 
that expanded upon Alcoa. 
Ninety-two years after the enactment of the Sherman Act7 and 
seventy-three years after the first case dealing with the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act reached the Court,8 Congress responded 
by enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) as 
part of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982.9 The FTAIA initially 
removes all foreign conduct involving non-import commerce from the 
reach of the Sherman Act.10 It then brings such conduct back within the 
reach of the Sherman Act if that conduct has a domestic effect and the 
effect gives rise to the plaintiff’s injury.11 
The general rule removing non-import foreign conduct from the 
reach of the Sherman Act is deemed the “exclusionary rule,”12 while the 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909). 
 5. 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 6. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597, 613–14 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006) (originally enacted as Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 
(1890)). 
 8. See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 355–59 (addressing the plaintiff’s claim that the 
defendant’s conduct abroad violated the Sherman Act). 
 9. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 401–03, 
96 Stat. 1233, 1246–47 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a). The text of the FTAIA provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce (other than import trade of import commerce) with foreign 
nations unless— 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with 
foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a 
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; 
and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 
to 7 of this title, other than this section. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
 10. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran I), 542 U.S. 155, 162 
(2004). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 158. 
3
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provisions bringing such conduct back within the reach of the Sherman 
Act can be labeled the “domestic-injury exception.”13 The domestic-
injury exception consists of two prongs. In short, prong one requires 
that the defendant’s conduct have a “direct, substantial, or reasonably 
foreseeable” effect on domestic or import commerce.14 Prong two 
requires that the effect from prong one “give[] rise to” a Sherman Act 
claim.15 
Unfortunately, the FTAIA has done little to achieve its fundamental 
purpose of clarifying American antitrust law for “businessmen, 
attorneys and judges as well as our trading partners.”16 Rather, the 
FTAIA has merely added to the mounting confusion surrounding the 
application of American antitrust laws to foreign conduct. 
Few significant opinions interpreting the FTAIA exist. The most 
important is F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran 
I).17 There the Court held, among other things, that foreign injury 
independent of the alleged domestic effect is insufficient to satisfy the 
FTAIA’s domestic-injury exception, thereby removing such a claim 
from the purview of the Sherman Act.18 The Court based its decision on 
principles of international comity and the FTAIA’s language and 
history.19 On remand, the D.C. Circuit in Empagran II addressed 
whether the foreign injury was in fact independent of the domestic 
effect.20 The court interpreted the second prong of the domestic-injury 
exception to require a proximate cause nexus between the foreign 
conduct’s domestic effects and foreign injury.21 
Most recently, in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit, sitting in an en banc panel of well-seasoned antitrust jurists, 
determined that the first prong of the domestic-injury exception also 
necessitates a proximate cause inquiry.22 According to the court, the 
term “direct,” within the “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable” language, requires that there be a proximate cause nexus 
between the foreign conduct and domestic effect.23 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. at 159. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2006). 
 15. Id. § 6a(2). 
 16. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, pt. 1, at 2–3 (1982) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
 17. 542 U.S. at 160–61 (granting certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding 
interpretation of the FTAIA). 
 18. Id. at 173, 175. 
 19. Id. at 164, 169. 
 20. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 21. Id. at 1270–71. 
 22. 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 23. Id. at 856–57. 
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It has been clear since October 9, 1982 that Congress should revisit 
the FTAIA.24 The case law following Empagran II added to the 
statute’s shortcomings.25 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Minn-Chem 
highlighted the fallacies, as well as corrected a number of other issues 
regarding FTAIA interpretation. 
This Note describes the foundation for the development of case law 
regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. The 
analysis in Part I moves from the enactment of the Sherman Act, to the 
first case interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, to 
the enactment of the FTAIA, and through significant cases interpreting 
the FTAIA. Thus, Part I establishes the need for the FTAIA but 
highlights Congress’s failure to provide adequate guidance to the courts. 
Part II analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s recent interpretations in Minn-
Chem and notes the significance of the court’s analysis of the statute’s 
wording. Part III begins by highlighting a peculiar result of Minn-
Chem’s and Empagran II’s interpretations of the statute and then 
evaluates the text of the FTAIA. This Note initially concludes that 
Minn-Chem’s interpretation as to prong one is correct, while Empargan 
II’s interpretation is at least questionable. 
Part IV rejects the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the second prong 
of the FTAIA’s domestic-injury exception. By analyzing Minn-Chem’s 
use of a proximate cause standard in prong one, Empagran II’s use of 
the same standard is called into question. Proximate cause is not the 
correct standard for the second prong of the domestic-injury exception. 
Thus, this Note concludes by proposing that but-for causation is the 
correct standard for the second prong. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT 
The evolution of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust 
laws warrants brief review for the purposes of this Note.26 In 1890, 
                                                                                                                     
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006) (originally enacted Oct. 8, 1982). 
 25. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really 
Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 16 (2012) (describing case law 
applying FTAIA in several circuits following Empagran II). 
 26. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 
1181–88 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (analyzing the history of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Act); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687–88 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (describing the history of extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act); 
Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law: 
What Is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 11, 12–13 (2003) (examining the history of 
territorial interpretaion of the Sherman Act); Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five 
Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285 (2007) 
(discussing the extraterritorial treatment of U.S. antitrust laws from enactment of Sherman Act 
5
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Congress enacted the Sherman Act, making illegal “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations.”27 The purposes of the 
Sherman Act have been described as “protect[ing] the public from the 
failure of the market”28 and “put[ting] an end to great aggregations of 
capital.”29 
A.  Early Application of the Sherman Act Abroad 
Nineteen years after the enactment of the Sherman Act, the Supreme 
Court first dealt with the extent of the statute’s extraterritorial 
application. In American Banana v. United Fruit Co.,30 the plaintiff, an 
Alabama Corporation, alleged that the defendant, a New Jersey 
corporation, engaged in anticompetitive behavior in Panama.31 As an 
initial matter, Justice Holmes noted that the “plaintiff’s case depends on 
several rather startling propositions,” namely, that the “acts causing the 
damage were done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States.”32 
Following a brief mention of comity and legislative limitations, the 
Court held that “it [is] entirely plain that what the defendant did in 
Panama . . . is not within the scope of the [Sherman Act] so far as the 
                                                                                                                     
through 2007); Edward L. Rholl, Inconsistent Application of the Extraterritorial Provisions of 
the Sherman Act: A Judicial Response Based on the Much Maligned “Effects” Test, 73 MARQ. 
L. REV. 435 (1990) (discussing extensively the progression of varied judicial approaches to 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act); Sam Halabi, Note, The “Comity” of Empagran: 
The Supreme Court Decides that Foreign Competition Regulation Limits American Antitrust 
Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 279, 280–88 (2005) (outlining the 
history of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act from 1909 through 2004); Evan 
Malloy, Note, Closing the Antitrust Door on Foreign Injuries: U.S. Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Antitrust Injuries in the Wake of Empagran, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 395, 401–04 (2006) 
(describing pre-FTAIA judicial treatment of extraterritorial antitrust claims); Kelly L. Tucker, 
Note, In the Wake of Empagran—Lights out on Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act 
Jurisdiction? Courts Carve out a Prevailing Standard, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 
808–20 (2010) (analyzing the history of extraterritorial jurisdiction in U.S. antitrust law). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 28. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
 29. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945); see 
also Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569 n.6 (1982) 
(describing congressional intent in enacting the Sherman Act as “a desire to enhance 
competition” (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 691 
(1978))); Fond du Lac Bumper Exch., Inc. v. Jui Li Enter. Co., 795 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (E.D. 
Wis. 2011) (“[T]he purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers and businesses in the 
American marketplace from injuries arising from anticompetitive activity.”); Bauer, supra note 
25, at 5 (describing the goals of antitrust laws as “enhancement of consumer welfare, the 
promotion of competition, and compensation of the victims of antitrust violations”). 
 30. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 31. Id. at 354. 
 32. Id. at 355. 
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present suit is concerned.”33 Even though both the plaintiff and 
defendant were domestic entities, U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over 
the Sherman Act claim because the allegedly anticompetitive conduct 
occurred abroad.34 
1.  The Erosion of American Banana 
Sometimes labeled as the “territoriality test,”35 the Court’s narrow 
approach toward extraterritoriality in American Banana was soon to be 
eroded. Just two years after American Banana, in United States v. 
American Tobacco Co., the Court held foreign corporations liable under 
the Sherman Act for an illegal combination consisting of both American 
and foreign entities.36 Similarly, in 1913, the Supreme Court found U.S. 
and Canadian companies liable under the Sherman Act where the 
companies monopolized a transportation route from the United States to 
Canada and Alaska,37 limiting freight and passengers to one continuous 
line of common carriers.38 In 1917, in Thomsen v. Cayser, the Court 
found antitrust liability where the defendants formed an unlawful 
combination in a foreign country to control shipping rates between New 
York and South Africa.39 
In 1927, the Court explicitly refused to apply American Banana.40 In 
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., the government sought, by “an 
excellent example of bad pleading,” to enjoin five U.S. corporations, a 
Mexican corporation, and various individuals from continuing 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 357. An important factor in the Court’s limited application was that, while a 
nation’s laws may govern its citizens in territories lacking sovereign authority, the laws of Costa 
Rica governed the territory where the conduct occurred. Id. at 355–56 (“[I]n regions subject to 
no sovereign . . . countries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their 
own law . . . .”). 
 34. Id. at 357; cf. Naomi Harlin Goodno, When the Commerce Clause Goes International: 
A Proposed Legal Framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1168 
(2013) (arguing that “congressional power to regulate foreign commerce” has always been 
consistently broad). 
 35. See, e.g., United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (labeling American Banana’s rule as a “territorial test”), overruled on other 
grounds by Minn-Chem v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Rholl, 
supra note 26, at 438 (referring to the “territoriality test”). 
 36. 221 U.S. 106, 182–83 (1911). 
 37. Alaska did not become a state until 1959. See Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-
508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
 38. United States v. Pac. &  Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 90–92 (1913). 
 39. 243 U.S. 66, 68–69, 88 (1917) (noting that because “the combination affected the 
foreign commerce of th[e] [United States] and was put into operation [in the United States],” the 
defendants were amenable to U.S. antitrust law). 
 40. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275–76 (1927) (distinguishing 
American Banana and noting that in American Banana, the plaintiff based its claim on “acts 
done outside the United States and not unlawful by the law of the place”). 
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monopolistic practices over importation and sale in sisal, a fiber used in 
making binder twine.41 The anticompetitive conduct occurred in both 
Mexico and the United States.42 Because the defendants “brought about 
forbidden results within” the United States, the Court reversed the 
dismissal of the complaint.43 Although Sisal Sales did not explicitly 
overrule American Banana, later opinions have recognized Sisal Sales 
as American Banana’s final demise.44 
2.  Alcoa and the Intended-Effects Test 
Some years later, Judge Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America (Alcoa),45 established the “intended-effects test,”46 which 
became the standard in determining the extraterritorial reach of the 
Sherman Act for years to come.47 In Alcoa, a Swiss corporation was 
formed pursuant to an agreement in 1931 among six signatories: a 
French corporation, two German corporations, a Swiss corporation, a 
British corporation, and a Canadian corporation.48 Subsequently, a 1936 
agreement required that supply restrictions target the United States.49 
Thereafter, the United States brought an action under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and the district court held for the defendants.50 
On appeal, Judge Hand construed the issue as “whether Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 271–74. 
 42. Id. at 276. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See W.S. Kirkpartrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 407–08 
(1990) (“[W]hatever [American Banana] said by way of dictum . . . has not survived Sisal 
Sales.”); see also Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 
680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[H]istory has proven American Banana not to be a seminal decision 
but an aberration: it is apparently the only foreign trade antitrust case lost by the Department of 
Justice for want of jurisdiction.”). 
 45. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Because “there [was] wanting a quorum of six Justices 
qualified to hear” the case in the Supreme Court, the appeal from the district court was certified 
and transferred to the Second Circuit. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 716, 716 
(1944) (transferring to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). 
 46. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. Others have referred to Alcoa’s test simply as the “effects 
test.” See, e.g., Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by 
Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 
420, 424 n.12 (5th Cir. 2001); Coors Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 889 F. Supp. 1394, 
1397 n.9 (D. Colo. 1995); ‘In’ Porters v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 497 
(M.D.N.C. 1987). To avoid confusion with prong one of the FTAIA’s domestic-injury 
exception, this Note refers to Alcoa’s rule as the “intended-effects” test. 
 47. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(“This wide-reaching ‘intended-effects’ test has been cited with approval by the Supreme 
Court.” (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 
(1962))). 
 48. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 442. 
 49. Id. at 442–43. 
 50. Id. at 443–45. 
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chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of 
persons not in allegiance to it.”51 The court cited American Banana for 
the proposition that courts should not attribute a legislative intent to 
hold parties liable for conduct that has no effect within the United 
States.52 Therefore, the court established a two-part test, requiring both 
intent and domestic effect.53 The court determined that the intent 
element was satisfied, because the 1936 agreement expressly sought to 
subject U.S. imports to supply restrictions.54 “[A]fter the intent to affect 
imports was proved, the burden of proof shifted to [the defendant].”55 
The question then became whether the quantity restrictions had any 
effect on domestic prices for aluminum.56 Presuming that any 
agreement removing from the market a substantial supply of a good 
would undoubtedly have an effect on prices, the court held that the 1936 
agreement violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.57 
Following Alcoa, the question of whether U.S. antitrust laws applied 
to foreign conduct depended upon “the situs of the effects as opposed to 
the conduct.”58 It was “abundantly plain that some extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act [was] proper.”59 However, the intended-
effects test has resulted in varied approaches and much confusion. 
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., the 
Ninth Circuit significantly honed the intended-effects test. Writing for 
the court, Judge Herbert Choy determined that the “effects test by itself 
is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations’ interests.”60 
Likewise, the test fails to account for the relationship between the 
parties and the United States.61 The court adopted a “tripartite 
analysis,”62 with the third inquiry based on “comity and fairness,” 
balancing a number of factors: 
 
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 443. 
 52. Id. (noting that “it is safe to assume” that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to 
apply to situations where foreign conduct had an effect but was unintentional). 
 53. Id. at 444. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 445. 
 57. Id. 
 58. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 59. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 
1980). 
 60. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 611–12 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
 61. Id. at 612. 
 62. Id. at 613. The first step focused on whether the conduct affected or intentionally 
affected foreign commerce of the United States. Id. at 615. The second inquiry analyzed the 
“type and magnitude” of the restraint. Id. 
9
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nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations 
or principal places of businesses of corporations, the 
extent to which enforcement by either state can be 
expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance 
of effects on the United States as compared with those 
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose 
to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability 
of such effect, and the relative importance to the 
violations charged of conduct within the United States as 
compared with conduct abroad.63 
 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Mannington Mills Corp. v. 
Congoleum Corp. mirrored Judge Choy’s reasoning in Timberlane, save 
for a difference in procedural approach and the inclusion of additional 
factors.64 Procedurally, Mannington Mills provided for a presumption of 
jurisdiction,65 followed by a comity analysis considering “whether 
jurisdiction should be exercised.”66 Timberlane treated the comity 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 614. 
 64. Mannington Mills Corp. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292, 1294, 1297–98 
(3d Cir. 1979). The factors to be considered under the Third Circuit’s analysis included: 
 
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; 
2. Nationality of the parties; 
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to 
that abroad; 
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; 
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its 
foreseeability; 
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction 
and grants relief; 
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being 
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting 
requirements by both countries; 
8. Whether the court can make its order effective; 
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made 
by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; 
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue. 
 
Id. at 1297–98 (footnote omitted). 
 65. See id. at 1292 (“[W]hen two American litigants are contesting alleged antitrust 
activity abroad that results in harm to the export business of one, a federal court does have 
subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 
100, 113 n.8 (1969))). 
 66. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added); see also Huffman, supra note 26, at 300 (labeling the 
Third Circuit’s discretionary approach as a “prudential standing” inquiry). The Seventh Circuit, 
in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, followed the Third Circuit’s lead. 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 
(7th Cir. 1980). In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the court outlined a two-pronged test, first 
determining “(1) does subject matter jurisdiction exist; and (2) if so, should it be exercised?” Id. 
In response to amici contentions that the intended-effects test is no longer settled law, following 
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analysis as part of the determination of subject-matter jurisdiction.67 
On the brink of congressional intervention, the Fifth Circuit, in 
Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui and Co., Ltd.,68 
noted that comity concerns should be included when applying the 
intended-effects test.69 However, the court expressly rejected the notion 
from Timberlane that comity concerns are evaluated as part of 
determining subject-matter jurisdiction.70 Similarly, the court disagreed 
with decisions that have determined a comity analysis to be 
discretionary.71 
B.  The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
In light of the mounting confusion regarding the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. antitrust laws, congressional intervention seemed 
inevitable. 
1.  Congressional Intervention: Enactment of the FTAIA 
In 1982, the 97th Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act, as § 7 of the Sherman Act.72 The statute provides: 
 
 Sections 1–7 of this title shall not apply to conduct 
involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or 
import commerce) with foreign nations unless— 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable  effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or 
commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or 
import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign 
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce 
in the United States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions 
                                                                                                                     
Mannington Mills and Timberlane, the court confirmed that the intended-effects test is 
embodied in prong one. Id. at 1254–55. 
 67. Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 613. But see In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 
F.2d at 1255 (imposing, incorrectly, the holding of Mannington Mills onto an interpretation of 
Timberlane: “[t]he clear thrust of the Timberlane Court is that once a district judge has 
determined that he has jurisdiction, he should consider additional factors to determine whether 
the exercise of that jurisdiction is appropriate” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. 671 F.2d 876, 884 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). 
 69. Id. at 884. 
 70. Id. at 884 n.7. 
 71. Id. (disagreeing “with the suggestion in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation that the 
question whether to entertain the suit is discretionary with the trial judge” (citation omitted)). 
 72. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 401–03, 
96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a). 
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of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.73 
 
According to the oft-quoted language of Justice Stephen Breyer, the 
FTAIA “lays down a general rule placing all (nonimport) activity 
involving foreign commerce outside the Sherman Act’s reach. It then 
brings such conduct back within the Sherman Act’s reach provided that 
the conduct . . . (1) sufficiently affects American commerce, . . . and (2) 
has an effect of a kind that antitrust law considers harmful.”74 In 
essence, the FTAIA creates a general exclusionary rule and then 
provides a domestic-injury exception75 to the general rule.76 The 
domestic-injury exception contains two prongs that correspond to the 
two sections of the statute.77 Prong one requires that the foreign conduct 
have “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on 
domestic commerce, and prong two requires that the effect from prong 
one “give[] rise to a [Sherman Act] claim.”78 
The explicit objectives of the FTAIA are to “encourage the business 
community to engage in efficiency-producing joint conduct in the 
export of American goods and services” and to create a singular, 
objective test for applying the Sherman Act to foreign conduct.79 
Congress sought to create a “clear benchmark . . . for businessmen, 
attorneys and judges as well as our trading partners.”80 In analyzing the 
                                                                                                                     
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
 74. Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004); see also 1 EARL W. KINTNER ET AL., FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW: A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 7.3, at 21–22 
(Supp. 2012) [hereinafter 1 KINTNER TREATISE] (quoting the same proposition). 
 75. See Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 159 (referring to the exception to the general 
exclusionary rule as the “domestic-injury exception”); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory  
Antitrust Litig. (DRAM), 546 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (calling the exception to the general 
exclusionary rule the “domestic-injury exception”); cf. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 904 F. 
Supp. 2d 310, 316–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (referring to a “domestic effects exception”); Fond du 
Lac Bumper Exch. v. Jui Li Enter. Co., 795 F. Supp. 2d 847, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (referring to 
a “domestic-injury exception”); In re Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 2011 
WL 1753738, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) (calling the rule the “domestic injury exception”); 
In re Static Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig. (SRAM), 2010 WL 5477313, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 21, 2010) (referring to a “domestic-injury exception”). 
 76. See Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 158–59, 162; see also supra notes 12–15 and 
accompanying text. 
 77. Id. at 158–59. 
 78. Id. at 158. 
 79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2–3; cf. Huffman, supra note 26, at 304–05 (noting 
three goals of the FTAIA: to alleviate concerns over the scope of extraterritorial application, to 
ease tension between the United States and its trading partners, and to articulate a standard for 
extraterritorial application). 
 80. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2–3 (emphasis added). References to “our trading 
partners” implies deference toward foreign entities and foreign sovereigns; therefore, while the 
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit balancing tests have seemingly been removed from analysis, 
comity considerations are alive and well. See id. at 13 (“[T]his bill would have no effect on the 
12
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second legislative purpose, the Judiciary Committee reiterated that 
Judge Hand’s standard in Alcoa remained the predominant legal 
standard.81 However, significant disparity over the “quantum and nature 
of the effects required to create jurisdiction” has resulted among the 
courts.82 
While necessary and noble in purpose, the FTAIA has done little to 
resolve the confusion regarding extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws. Indeed, Professor Max Huffman states that the FTAIA 
“has failed at its essential purpose.”83 In reference to the FTAIA, 
Professor Joseph Bauer writes, “It keeps getting worse and worse.”84 
Professor Chris Sagers labels the statute as “notoriously difficult to 
read.”85 Judge Diane Sykes of the Seventh Circuit describes the FTAIA 
as “awkwardly phrased,”86 and lastly, Judge Susan Illston of the 
Northern District of California states that “the FTAIA operates in a 
peculiar fashion.”87 
2.  From Disregard to Confusion: Early FTAIA 
Over ten years after the enactment of the FTAIA, the Supreme 
Court, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, granted certiorari 
“to address the application of the Sherman Act to the foreign conduct at 
issue.”88 In Hartford Fire, the plaintiffs, nineteen states and a number of 
private parties, alleged that the defendants, London reinsurers of 
commercial general liability insurance, had engaged in conspiracies that 
                                                                                                                     
courts’ ability to employ notions of comity.” (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 
N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976))). This Note contends, infra Section III.B., that the 
term “substantial” within the first prong of the domestic-injury exception includes a comity 
analysis. 
 81. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Huffman, supra note 26, at 286. 
 84. Bauer, supra note 25, at 4. 
 85. Interview by Lauren Chang, Managing Editor of Competition Policy Int’l, with Chris 
Sagers, Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Coll. of Law (audio file at 0:03:40) (July 2012) 
[hereinafter CPI Interview], available at http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/
Free/Interview-Potash-II.mp3. 
 86. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 684 
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 87. In re TFT–LCD Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also 
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (labeling the FTAIA as 
“inelegantly phrased”); McLafferty v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., 2009 WL 3365881, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 16, 2009) (describing the language of the FTAIA as “somewhat inartfully stat[ed]”). 
 88. 509 U.S. 764, 779 (1993). In a post-FTAIA case dealing with antitrust liability for 
foreign conduct, the Court avoided an FTAIA inquiry, summarily stating that “[r]espondents 
cannot recover antitrust damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese 
market, because American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other 
nations’ economies.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 
(1986) (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
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affected American policyholders.89 The District Court for the Northern 
District of California dismissed the claims as to the foreign defendants, 
invoking comity concerns and applying Timberlane.90 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed.91 Also applying its decision in Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that five of the six “comity factors of Timberlane” 
necessitated an exercise of jurisdiction, whereas only one factor (the 
degree of conflict with British law) weighed in favor of abstention.92 
Accordingly, international comity did not prohibit the exercise of 
Sherman Act jurisdiction.93 
In determining subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
initially avoided the language of the FTAIA and deferred to Alcoa’s 
intended-effects test.94 Because the complaint alleged that the London 
reinsurers “engaged in unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for 
insurance in the United States,” subject-matter jurisdiction existed.95 
The foreign defendants contended that the district court should not 
exercise jurisdiction for international comity reasons.96 However, 
because no conflict existed between British and American laws for the 
purposes of the present litigation, “international comity would not 
counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged 
here.”97 Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
and extended subject-matter jurisdiction to the foreign defendants.98 
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented as to the extraterritorial application 
of the Sherman Act.99 He separated the inquiry into two distinct issues: 
“whether the District Court had jurisdiction, and whether the Sherman 
                                                                                                                     
 89. 509 U.S. at 795. 
 90. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 490–91 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d; 938 F.2d 
919, 934 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 91. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 934. 
 92.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 932–34. 
 94. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 (“[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act 
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial 
effect in the United States.”). While it seems strange that the Court initially avoided the 
statutory language, the Court’s analysis may very well be appropriate as the FTAIA sought to 
codify the intended-effects test of Alcoa. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5; see also 
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated, 
Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). But cf. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n.23 (expressing 
uncertainty as to whether the FTAIA codifies the common law standard). 
 95. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796. 
 96. Id. at 797. In response, the Court noted that upon enactment of the FTAIA, “Congress 
expressed no view on the question of whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever 
decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.” Id. at 798. But see 
supra note 80 (arguing that the legislative history explicitly indicates an intent to incorporate 
comity concerns). 
 97. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798–99. 
 98. Id. at 799. 
 99. Id. at 800 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Act reaches the extraterritorial conduct alleged here.”100 Because the 
plaintiffs alleged a federal question, the first issue, labeled “adjudicative 
jurisdiction,”101 was easily disposed of.102 As to the second issue, the 
proper inquiry was whether the authority of the sovereign permitted 
application of its law to particular conduct.103 Justice Scalia employed 
two canons of statutory construction to determine the reach of the 
Sherman Act.104 Antitrust case law rebuts the first canon, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, and extends the Sherman Act 
abroad.105 The second canon is that courts should not interpret an act of 
Congress to conflict with the “laws of nations” or “customary 
international law.”106 Within this realm, notions of “prescriptive 
comity” arise and are to be afforded attention in determining whether 
Congress has the authority to apply U.S. law to the foreign conduct.107 
Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the parties failed to “make a clear 
distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and the scope of the 
statute” and applied an incorrect comity standard.108 
Subsequently, the Court revisited the FTAIA in Empagran I.109 In 
the district court, the plaintiffs, foreign and domestic purchasers of 
vitamins, alleged that the defendants, foreign and domestic vitamin 
distributors and manufacturers, had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy 
and thereby increased prices in the United States and abroad.110 As to 
the foreign plaintiffs, corporate purchasers domiciled in Ecuador, 
Panama, Australia, and Ukraine, none had purchased vitamins within 
the United States.111 Rather, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
engaged in a global price-fixing conspiracy and that as a result, the 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. at 812. 
 101. See id. at 820. 
 102. Id. at 812 (stating that “28 U.S.C. § 1331 vests district courts with subject-matter 
jurisdiction over cases ‘arising under’ federal statutes”). 
 103. Id. at 813 (“This refers to ‘the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons 
or activities,’ and is quite a separate matter from ‘jurisdiction to adjudicate.’” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) (Part IV 
Jurisdiction and Judgments: Introductory Note)). 
 104. Id. at 813–14. 
 105. Id. at 814. 
 106. Id. at 814−15 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 118 
(1804). 
 107. Id. at 817. Justice Scalia defined “prescriptive comity” as “the respect sovereign 
nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.” Id. 
 108. Id. at 820. 
 109. Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004). 
 110. Id. at 159−60. 
 111. Id. The district court opinion outlines a broader array of foreign defendants. Empagran 
S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 2001 WL 761360, at *1 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001) (“Plaintiffs 
in this case represent foreign corporations domiciled in Ecuador, Panama, Australia, Mexico, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, and the Ukraine . . . .”),  rev’d, 315 F.3d 338, 341 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 175 (2004). 
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plaintiffs had to pay inflated prices for vitamins abroad.112 Applying the 
FTAIA, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the 
foreign plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because 
“[p]laintiffs have not alleged that the precise injuries for which they 
seek redress here have the requisite domestic effects necessary to 
provide subject matter jurisdiction over this case.”113 Subsequently, the 
domestic purchasers transferred their claims, and the foreign purchasers 
appealed.114 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit construed the issue to be whether the 
second prong of the domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA (governing 
the relationship between the effect and injury) “authorizes subject 
matter jurisdiction where the defendant’s conduct affects both domestic 
and foreign commerce, but the plaintiff’s claim arises only from the 
conduct’s foreign effect.”115 After analyzing the statute’s language, 
structure, history, and additional relevant policy, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the dismissal.116 Therefore, the court held that subject-matter 
jurisdiction existed even where the foreign injury is independent of a 
domestic effect.117 
In the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer focused on the second prong of 
the domestic-injury exception and narrowed the issue to “how th[e] 
language [of the FTAIA] applies to price-fixing activity that is in 
significant part foreign, that has the domestic effect, and that also has 
independent foreign effects giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim.”118 The 
Court held that the domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA did not 
apply, and therefore subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking.119 Justice 
Breyer articulated two reasons for this holding.120 First, citing Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire, the “Court ordinarily construes 
ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the 
sovereign authority of other nations.”121 Second, the FTAIA specifically 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Empagran S.A., 2001 WL 761360, at *1. 
 113. Id. at *3−4. 
 114. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 160. 
 115. Empagran S.A., 315 F.3d at 344, vacated, Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 116. Id. at 341, 357. 
 117. Id. at 341. 
 118. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added). The Court granted certiorari to 
resolve a circuit split between the Fifth, Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 
F.3d 420, 426 n.19, 430−31 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendants’ conduct must give rise 
to the plaintiffs’ particular claim) and Second Circuits, Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 352 F.3d 73, 
77–78 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendants’ conduct must give rise to a claim, not 
necessarily the plaintiffs’ claim) as to whether the domestic effects of prong one must give rise 
to plaintiff’s specific claim or simply any claim. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 160−61; see also 
Halabi, supra note 26, at 283–85 (outlining the circuit split). 
 119. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 164, 166−67. 
 120. Id. at 164. 
 121. Id. (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
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sought to clarify, not expand, the Sherman Act’s scope regarding 
foreign commerce.122 In response to the plaintiffs’ linguistic arguments, 
the Court determined that the language of the second prong, “gives rise 
to a claim,”123 implies that the effect must give rise to the “plaintiff’s 
claim” or “the claim at issue.”124 Therefore, because the plaintiffs’ 
injury was independent of the domestic effect, subject-matter 
jurisdiction did not exist.125 
On remand to the D.C. Circuit in Empagran II, Judge Karen 
Henderson addressed the plaintiffs’ alternate theory, regarding the 
requisite nexus between the domestic effect and foreign injury.126 The 
plaintiffs argued that their foreign injury was not, in fact, independent of 
the domestic effect but that “maintaining super-competitive prices in the 
United States” caused their foreign injury.127 Seemingly out of thin air, 
Judge Henderson rejected “but-for” causation as a sufficient nexus and 
adopted proximate cause as the required relationship between the 
domestic effect and foreign injury.128 According to the court, allowing 
for a broader standard would bring into question the comity concerns 
that the court sought to avoid.129 Therefore, applying the proximate 
cause standard to the second prong, the D.C. Circuit determined that 
“the domestic effects the appellants cite did not give rise to their 
claimed injuries so as to bring their Sherman Act claim within the 
FTAIA exception.”130 
                                                                                                                     
dissenting)). While courts have regularly allowed for U.S. antitrust laws to reach foreign 
conduct with a domestic effect, the Court determined that application where a foreign injury is 
independent of the domestic effect violates basic principles of prescriptive comity, in sharp 
contrast to Hartford Fire’s avoidance of comity considerations. Id. at 165−66. 
 122. Id. at 169. 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 124. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 174. 
 125. Id. at 175. 
 126. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 127. Id. at 1270. 
 128. Id. at 1271 (“The statutory language—‘gives rise to’—indicates a direct causal 
relationship, that is, proximate causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for ‘nexus’ that 
[plaintiffs] advanced in their brief.”). Others have been equally disturbed by the lack of 
justification for adopting a proximate cause standard. See Erica P. Siegmund, Note, 
Extraterritoriality and the Unique Analogy Between Multinational Antitrust and Securities 
Fraud Claims, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1047, 1062–64 (2011). 
 129. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
 130. Id. Empagran II and its progeny have continued to require a proximate cause standard 
for the second prong of the domestic-injury exception, and in doing so, such decisions have 
continued to find a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where plaintiffs allege injury based on an 
arbitrage theory. See DRAM, 546 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Monosodium Glutamate 
Antitrust Litig. (MSG), 477 F.3d 535, 538–39 (8th Cir. 2007); In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo 
Nobel Chem. B.V., 2005 WL 2207017, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005). 
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II.  THE FTAIA IN 2012: CLARITY FROM THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
More recently, the Seventh Circuit grappled with the FTAIA. In 
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., the plaintiffs were U.S. companies 
that were direct and indirect purchasers of potash, a mineral or chemical 
salt primarily used in agricultural fertilizers.131 The defendants were 
entities from Canada, Russia, Belarus, and the United States that 
“market, sell, and distribute potash.”132 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants were the primary members of an international cartel that 
“restrained global output of potash in order to inflate prices.”133 
Allegedly, the defendants fixed prices in Brazil, China, and India, and 
used those prices as benchmarks to drive up prices in the United 
States.134 Because demand for potash is inelastic,135 the defendants 
could increase prices significantly.136 Therefore, while fertilizer prices 
remained steady between 2003 and 2008, potash prices increased more 
than 600%.137 
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.138 In its opinion, the district court paved 
the way for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and 
eventually certified two questions to the Seventh Circuit, including 
whether the complaint alleged conduct that fell within the FTAIA’s 
domestic-injury exception.139 In the Seventh Circuit, the initial panel 
vacated the district court’s order and instructed the district court to grant 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss on remand.140 Just over two months 
later, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en 
banc.141 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 132. Id. at 848−49 
 133. Id. at 849. 
 134. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 135. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
730 (3d. ed. 1993) (defining “elastic” as “enlarging or decreasing readily in demand in response 
to changes in price”). 
 136. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 849; cf. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 667 F. Supp. 2d 907, 
916 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Minn-Chem, Inc 683 F.3d 845, (“[D]emand for potash is 
elastic; as potash prices increase, buyers tend to purchase at the higher price, rather than 
decrease the amount of their purchases.” (emphasis added)). The district court seems to have 
misconstrued “elasticity.” In fact, because demand remains unchanged in lieu of price increases, 
demand for potash is inelastic. 
 137. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 849. 
 138. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 667 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
 139. Id. at 937; Minn-Chem, 657 F.3d at 656−57. 
 140. Minn-Chem, 657 F.3d at 663–64. The panel decision adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
definition of “direct,” requiring that a domestic effect be an “immediate consequence” of the 
foreign conduct. Id. at 661–62. As a result, the court held that the allegations in the complaint 
were insufficient to satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s definition. Id. at 663−64. 
 141. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. No. 10-1712 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011) (order granting 
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Judge Diane Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc, 
approached three critical issues regarding the FTAIA.142 The first 
involved whether the FTAIA is a jurisdictional or substantive 
requirement.143 The second entailed the treatment of import commerce, 
and the third involved the causal relationship between the 
anticompetitive conduct and the domestic effect.144 
A.  Merit-Based Limitation 
As to the first issue, the court focused on whether the FTAIA 
constituted a jurisdictional requirement or merely an element of a 
Sherman Act claim.145 Broadly speaking, the court considered whether 
Congress was exercising its Article III power to determine jurisdiction 
of the lower courts or whether it was using its Article I power to 
regulate interstate commerce. The en banc court held that “the FTAIA 
sets forth an element of an antitrust claim, not a jurisdictional limit on 
the power of the federal courts.”146 Therefore, the statute goes not to a 
court’s jurisdiction over a claim involving foreign conduct; rather, the 
statute is relevant to the merits of a Sherman Act claim.147 
The previous panel decision recognized that, in light of two recent 
Supreme Court decisions in Morrison v. National Australian Bank, 
Ltd.148 and Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,149 the issue was ripe for 
reconsideration.150 Regardless, the panel chose not to decide the issue, 
as the complaint could properly be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.151 However, upon rehearing en banc, Judge Wood revisited the 
issue.152 The court followed the lead of the Third Circuit in Animal 
Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp.153 and relied on the 
                                                                                                                     
petition for rehearing en banc); see Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 848. 
 142. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 851, 854, 856; see also 1 KINTNER TREATISE, supra note 74, 
§ 7.3, at 25 (explaining that the Minn-Chem court “reinterpreted FTAIA on three critical 
issues”); CPI Interview, supra note 85 (audio file at 0:00:52) (noting that the Minn-Chem 
decision is “really . . . three opinions”). 
 143. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 851–53. 
 144. Id. at 856–58. 
 145. Id. at 851–53. 
 146. Id. at 852. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876–77 (2010) (holding that extraterritorial application of § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act necessitates a merits inquiry: “to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches 
is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question”). 
 149. 546 U.S. 500, 515−16 (2006) (holding that Title VII’s employee-numerosity 
requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), “is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a 
jurisdictional issue”). 
 150. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 657−59 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 151. Id. at 659. 
 152. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 851. 
 153. 654 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2011), overruling Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, 
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Supreme Court’s newfound aversion to “drive-by jurisdictional” 
rulings.154 Specifically, Judge Wood wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison, we believe, provides all the guidance we need to 
conclude that” the FTAIA reaches the merits of the claim and does not 
represent a jurisdictional hurdle.155 The court thereby overruled its en 
banc ruling in United Phosphorus v. Angus Chemical,156 issued nine 
years earlier.157 
In justifying its decision, the court stated that “[w]hen Congress 
decides to strip the courts of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . it speaks 
clearly.”158 Furthermore, the court determined that the statute does not 
approach the use of the term “jurisdiction.”159 It is important to note that 
while the statute avoids any explicit reference to a court’s jurisdiction, 
the legislative history certainly does reference the court’s jurisdiction.160 
In fact, upon enacting the FTAIA, the Judiciary Committee mentioned 
                                                                                                                     
Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300–02 (3d. Cir. 2002), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 
227 F.3d 62, 69, 70–73 (3d Cir. 2000). Less than a year before Minn-Chem, the Third Circuit 
reached a similar conclusion regarding whether the FTAIA was a jurisdictional or substantive 
requirement. Animal Sci., 654 F.3d at 466. Distinguishing between “legislative jurisdiction” and 
“judicial jurisdiction,” the Third Circuit held that the FTAIA constitutes “a substantive merits 
limitation rather than a jurisdictional bar.” Id. at 467–69. In enacting the FTAIA, the Third 
Circuit determined that Congress was exercising its Commerce Clause authority to delineate the 
merits of an antitrust claim rather than its Article III authority to determine the jurisdiction of 
the lower federal courts. Id. 
 154. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of 
“Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 947 (2011) (outlining the Court’s 
“multi-Term effort towards better defining which legal rules properly should be called 
‘jurisdictional’”); Edward Valdespino, Note, Shifting Viewpoints: The Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act, a Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 457 (2009) 
(analyzing the history and the pre-Animal Science shift in interpretations of the FTAIA as a 
jurisdictional requirement); Daniel Wotherspoon, Comment, The “Element” Surprise: The 
Third Circuit Bucks the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act Trend in Animal Science 
Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 57 VILL. L. REV. 785 (2012) (considering the Third 
Circuit’s recent treatment of the FTAIA as a substantive requirement). But cf. Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2007) (holding that time requirements within FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) are 
jurisdictional; because petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, the appellate court lacked 
jurisdiction). 
 155. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852; see also In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 
2d 953, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“This Court agrees with the Third Circuit that application of the 
‘clearly states’ test necessitates the finding that the FTAIA does not affect subject matter 
jurisdiction.” (citing Animal Sci., 654 F.3d at 468–69)); cf. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision 
Indus. Co., 2013 WL 2099227, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) (noting that the Second Circuit, 
post-Morrison, has not yet determined that the FTAIA represents a merits requirement, as 
opposed to a subject-matter jurisdiction requirement); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 904 F. 
Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (same). 
 156. 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 157. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 848, 852. 
 158. Id. at 852. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2 (first mentioning “jurisdiction”). 
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“jurisdiction” over twenty times in its report,161 even referring to the 
FTAIA as a “jurisdictional test.”162 In its own words, “This bill only 
establishes the standards necessary for assertion of United States 
antitrust jurisdiction. The substantive antitrust issues on the merits of 
the plaintiffs’ claim would remain unchanged.”163 Furthermore, the very 
nature of the FTAIA as an extraterritorial provision logically evokes 
notions of jurisdiction. One cannot envision, absent explicit statutory 
reference, a clearer congressional intent to affect a court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction, and according to Judge Hand’s opinion in Alcoa, on 
issues of extraterritoriality, Congress’s intent is the determining 
factor.164 Regardless, Judge Wood clung to the language within the 
statute to determine that the statute referenced “conduct,” a merits 
question, not a jurisdictional question.165 
On first glance, the procedural and substantive repercussions of the 
recharacterization seem minimal. However, implications for both 
plaintiffs and defendants may be significant.166 In the Seventh Circuit, 
plaintiffs will be affected because complaints will be attacked under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as opposed to 12(b)(1). 
Therefore, a complaint will be subject to the heightened pleading 
requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal167 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly.168 Defendants will be affected because the burden now rests 
with the defendant to challenge a complaint under a 12(b)(6) motion169 
or a motion for summary judgment.170 Previously, defendants proceeded 
under a 12(b)(1) motion, where the burden rested with the plaintiff to 
demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction.171 Moreover, if the plaintiff 
withstands a 12(b)(6) attack, the defendant must now proceed with a 
lengthy and intrusive discovery process before moving for summary 
                                                                                                                     
 161. Id. passim. 
 162. Id. at 9. Similarly, the report from the Judiciary Committee uses the term 
“jurisdictional” three times. Id. at 9, 12. 
 163. Id. at 11. 
 164. See supra Subsection I.A.2. 
 165. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 166. See Wotherspoon, supra note 154, at 801–05 (analyzing the impact and policy 
considerations of the Third Circuit’s parallel decision). 
 167. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 168. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 169. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating that, in evaluating a complaint for failure to state a 
claim, “a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint” (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007))). 
 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (placing burden on the “movant”). 
 171. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (“[I]t is the burden of the 
party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor clearly to allege facts demonstrating that 
he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 
(1936) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975))). 
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judgment. Lastly, the recharacterization affects courts, as they may no 
longer raise sua sponte an FTAIA deficiency based on lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.172 
B.  Import Commerce 
The second issue addressed in Minn-Chem involved the FTAIA’s 
treatment of import commerce. First, the opening phrase173 provides that 
the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign 
nations.”174 Therefore, import commerce is understood to fall squarely 
within the confines of the Sherman Act and need not be subject to an 
FTAIA inquiry.175 Judge Wood rejected the Third Circuit’s 
characterization of an “import exception” and provided that “[i]mport 
trade and commerce are excluded at the outset from the coverage of the 
FTAIA in the same way that domestic interstate commerce is 
excluded.”176 In essence, the statutory language implies that import 
trade or commerce has a per se domestic effect, and courts need not 
waste their time stumbling through the FTAIA provisions. As a reason 
for the exemption, the court noted that “applicability of U.S. law to 
transactions” in U.S. import trade or commerce is “fully predictable to 
foreign entities and necessary for the protection of U.S. consumers.”177 
Provided that import trade or commerce is fully amenable to the 
Sherman Act and not subject to the FTAIA, the court exerted additional 
effort in defining “import commerce.”178 In doing so, the court isolated 
the alleged conduct between “foreign sellers and domestic buyers” and 
noted that “transactions that are directly between the [U.S.] purchasers 
and the [foreign] cartel members are the import commerce of the United 
States in this sector.”179 Interestingly, the court nonetheless required that 
the conduct in import commerce satisfy the requirements of Alcoa and 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 173. Id. at 854 (referring to the opening phrase as the “chapeau”). 
 174. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
 175. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 854; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 10 (“It is thus 
clear that wholly foreign transactions as well as export transactions are covered by the 
amendment, but that import transactions are not.”). 
 176. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 854; see also CPI Interview, supra note 85 (audio file at 
0:04:44) (noting a “point of tension” between the Seventh and Third Circuits regarding 
characterization of the statute’s treatment of import commerce). 
 177. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 854. 
 178. Id. at 855. 
 179. Id. Unfortunately, because the isolated conduct fell readily within even the narrowest 
definition of import commerce, the court was not able to analyze the oft-litigated question of 
whether alleged conduct “involved import commerce.” See infra Section III.A. (discussing the 
different interpretations regarding whether conduct “involves import commerce”). 
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Hartford Fire.180 Indeed, the FTAIA served to codify Alcoa’s intended-
effects test,181 and it would seem contrary to congressional intent to 
continue to apply the intended-effects test to import commerce that 
Congress specifically excluded from the FTAIA.182 
Regarding the allegations involving import commerce, the court held 
that the complaint “contain[ed] ample material,” sufficient under the 
general requirements of Hartford Fire, to withstand a 12(b)(6) 
motion.183 As to the other conduct within the complaint, such conduct, 
not being directly between foreign sellers and domestic buyers,184 did 
not readily constitute import commerce and was thus subject to an 
FTAIA inquiry. 
C.  Directness 
A third major issue that the Seventh Circuit addressed in Minn-Chem 
was the requisite nexus between the anticompetitive conduct and 
domestic effect. Recall that prong one of the domestic injury exception 
required that, for the Sherman Act to apply, the foreign conduct must 
have “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on 
domestic commerce. The Minn-Chem court set out to decipher the 
meaning of “direct.”185 In doing so, the court rejected the definition 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit.186 
In United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the term “direct” required that an effect “follow[] as an 
immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.”187 The Ninth 
Circuit relied on Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.188 In Weltover, 
the Supreme Court defined “direct” as used within the Foreign 
                                                                                                                     
 180. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 855. 
 181. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. 
 182. Professor Bauer seems to agree with the court’s analysis, as the continued application 
of the “Alcoa Hartford Fire standard” to import commerce would serve to alleviate fears of 
overapplication of the Sherman Act. Bauer, supra note 25, at 20–21; see also Beckler & 
Kirtland, supra note 26, at 14 (“Extraterritorial conduct that directly affects import commerce is 
analyzed under the Supreme Court’s Hartford Fire test, not the FTAIA.”). 
 183. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 858. 
 184. For example, defendant Canpotex, Ltd., “a Canadian company that sold, marketed, 
and distributed potash throughout the world excluding the United States,” was wholly owned, in 
equal shares, by three other defendants and was a major player in the execution of the cartel, 
albeit outside of North America. Id. at 850–51. 
 185. Id. at 856–58. 
 186. Id. at 857.  
 187. 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon 
Hai Precision Indus. Co., 2013 WL 2099227, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) (also adopting the 
“immediate consequence” definition of “direct”). 
 188. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 680 (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 
U.S. 607, 618 (1992)). 
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Sovereign Immunities Act.189 The Weltover Court “reject[ed] the 
suggestion that § 1605(a)(2) contains any unexpressed requirement of 
‘substantiality’ or foreseeability.”190 Had such terms been included, the 
substantiality or foreseeability language would have qualified the 
directness requirement.191 
In rejecting the Supreme Court’s definition adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit noted that considerations of substantiality 
and foreseeability were explicitly incorporated into the FTAIA and may 
not be ignored.192 Judge Wood opted to embrace the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division’s definition—that direct “means only ‘a 
reasonably proximate causal nexus.’”193 As the court noted, it would be 
unworkable to build the notion of immediacy into a statutory phrase that 
includes such qualifiers as “substantial” and “foreseeable.”194 
Thus, the focus of the term “direct” is remoteness. The court quoted 
Alcoa for the proposition that congressional intent to punish foreign 
conduct too remote to its domestic effects should not be implied into the 
Sherman Act.195 Therefore, “[j]ust as tort law cuts off recovery for those 
whose injuries are too remote from the cause of an injury, so does the 
FTAIA exclude from the Sherman Act foreign activities that are too 
remote from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import 
commerce.”196 
Accordingly, regarding the non-import commerce, the court held that 
“[i]t is no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and the 
concomitant price increases forced upon the Chinese purchasers, were a 
direct—that is, proximate—cause of the subsequent price increases in 
the United States.”197 As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2006). 
 190. 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 193. Id.at 856–57 (quoting Makam Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: 
Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 415, 430 (2005)). 
 194. Id. at 857 (“Superimposing the idea of ‘immediate consequence’ . . . results in a 
stricter test than the complete text of the statute can bear. To demand a foreseeable, substantial, 
and ‘immediate’ consequence on import . . . commerce comes close to ignoring the fact that 
straightforward import commerce has already been excluded from the FTAIA’s coverage.”); see 
also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 (“United States antitrust laws should be applicable to an 
international transaction ‘when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States 
commerce’ . . . .” (quoting ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T. OF LABOR, ANTITRUST GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6–7 (1977)). 
 195. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857 (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)). In 
turn, Judge Hand, in Alcoa, cited American Banana in making that same proposition. Alcoa, 148 
F.2d at 443 (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)). 
 196. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857. 
 197. Id. at 859. 
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district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.198 
D.  Significance 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Minn-Chem is likely to have 
significance within the narrow realm of FTAIA case law. Much like the 
district court opinions in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co.199 and Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf and Western 
Industries, Inc.200 that thoroughly outlined pre-FTAIA case law, Minn-
Chem examines the convoluted wording of the statute. Likewise, the 
participation of Judge Wood, Judge Richard Posner, and Judge Frank 
Easterbrook warrants deference in itself.201 Others find satisfaction in 
the Seventh Circuit’s broad treatment of import commerce and the 
directness requirement of the first prong of the FTAIA.202 As a result, 
the FTAIA’s impact in barring antitrust suits alleging foreign conduct is 
significantly limited, allowing for a more expansive extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act. Still, others even liken future 
significance to that of Empagran I.203 Most important, for purposes of 
this Note, the Seventh Circuit’s decision highlights the misconceptions 
of Empagran II and its progeny, and this Note will continually revisit 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretations below. 
III.  REINTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF THE FTAIA 
As a brief reminder, the language of the FTAIA begins with the 
exclusionary rule, which removes all non-import foreign conduct from 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Id. 
 199. 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1180–89 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 200. 473 F. Supp. 680, 687–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 201. Judge Wood, the author of the opinion, has served as Deputy Assistant General in the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has worked on the project to revise the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Guide for International Operations and has published a number 
of works regarding antitrust law, specifically international antitrust issues. Diane P. Wood 
Faculty Biography, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/wood-d (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2013). Judge Posner, among other things, is an antitrust scholar and leader in the field 
of law and economics. Richard A. Posner Faculty Biography, U. CHI. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). Chief Judge 
Easterbrook is similarly well-known for antitrust scholarship. Frank H. Easterbrook Faculty 
Biography, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/514/publications (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2013). 
 202. See Bauer, supra note 25, at 20 (“This decision marks a healthy re-direction of 
FTAIA’s exclusion of actions challenging foreign behavior . . . .”). Professor Bauer expresses 
concern that the panel decision, among decisions by other courts, served to expand the FTAIA 
and bar antitrust relief for private plaintiffs. Id. at 19. However, the en banc decision honed in 
the FTAIA, allowing for the antitrust laws to continue to “apply when th[e] behavior impacts 
domestic commerce and harms domestic consumers.” Id. at 20. 
 203. CPI Interview, supra note 85 (audio file at 0:03:05). 
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the reach of the Sherman Act.204 The FTAIA then sets forth the 
domestic-injury exception, which brings certain conduct back within the 
reach of the Sherman Act if the conduct satisfies two prongs. Prong one 
governs the relationship between the foreign conduct and domestic 
effect and requires that, for the Sherman Act to apply, the conduct must 
have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on 
domestic commerce.205 Prong two governs the relationship between the 
effect and injury and requires that the effect from prong one must 
“give[] rise to” the plaintiff’s injury. 
A peculiar result comes to light when combining the holding of the 
Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem with that of the D.C. Circuit in 
Empagran II. Recall that the third critical interpretation in Minn-Chem 
speaks to the language of the first prong.206 Specifically, the Minn-
Chem court concluded that the term “direct” within “direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable” necessitates a proximate cause relationship 
between the foreign conduct and the domestic effect.207 Therefore, a 
foreign actor engaging in anticompetitive conduct abroad may be haled 
into U.S. court for violations of the Sherman Act if the conduct 
proximately causes an adverse domestic effect and the effect satisfies 
the second prong of the domestic-injury exception. 208 
 
Similarly, recall that Empagran II provided that the language of the 
second prong “indicates a direct causal relationship, that is proximate 
cause.”209 Therefore, as in Empagran II, where a foreign plaintiff 
alleges foreign injury as a result of foreign conduct, the foreign injury 
must be proximately related to an adverse domestic effect.210 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
 205.  Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 158–59. 
 206. See supra Section II.C. 
 207. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–58 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), 
cert. dismissed, No. 12-650, 2013 WL 3790907 (U.S. July 22, 2013). 
 208. See id.; supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
 209. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Specifically, the court held that 
the “gives rise to” language of the second prong necessitates a proximate cause standard. Id. 
 210. Id. 
Conduct Effect Injury 
Prong 1 Prong 2 
Proximate Cause 
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As a result of combining Empagran II and Minn-Chem, both the first 
and second prongs of the FTAIA would require a proximate cause 
inquiry. Within the first prong, foreign conduct must be proximately 
related to a domestic effect, and within the second prong, the injury 
must be proximately related to the domestic effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This proximate cause overload raises the question of whether the two 
opinions should be read together. And if not, is one more correct than 
the other?  
A.  The Opening Phrase: Exclusionary Rule and Import 
Commerce 
To properly evaluate such an inquiry, one must begin with the 
language of the FTAIA, moving from the opening phrase, to the first 
prong, then to the second prong.211 In its full text, the opening phrase 
provides “[s]ections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct 
involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import 
commerce) with foreign nations.”212 Read together, the opening phrase 
outlines the general exclusionary rule, moving foreign non-import trade 
or commerce outside of the reach of the Sherman Act.213  
As to the wording itself, the phrase,”[s]ections 1 to 7 of this title,” 
refers to the Sherman Act.214 Following is the phrase, “conduct 
involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations.”215 Although not 
                                                                                                                     
 211. See Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 853 (“Although the FTAIA has been parsed in a number 
of judicial opinions, including notably Empagran, we think it important to begin with the 
language of the statute . . . .”). 
 212. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
 213. See Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004). 
 214. See Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7). 
 215. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. It is important to note that the “with foreign nations” language does 
not require that the anticompetitive conduct be with a foreign sovereign. United States v. 
Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417 (1865). Rather, the “with foreign nations” requirement covers 
Conduct Effect Injury 
Prong 1 Prong 2 
Proximate Cause 
Conduct Effect Injury 
Prong 1 Prong 2 
Proximate Cause Proximate Cause 
Prong 2 
Proximate Cause 
Prong 1 
Proximate Cause 
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normally a point of contention, the Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem 
evaluated whether the alleged conduct involved foreign trade or 
commerce.216 The court held that the allegations of successful price 
increases by an “international cartel in a commodity” sufficed as 
conduct involving foreign trade or commerce.217 Indeed, questions of 
involvement in foreign commerce are rarely discussed in FTAIA 
jurisprudence. 
The “involvement” terminology does, however, come into 
contention when outlining the statute’s import commerce exclusion.218 
Removed from prior analysis, the parenthetical in the opening phrase 
provides that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving 
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce).”219 
Termed the “import commerce exclusion,”220 the parenthetical serves to 
remove import commerce from an FTAIA inquiry.221 However, some 
conflict arises in evaluating the statute’s treatment of conduct involving 
import commerce. As previously discussed, the Seventh Circuit, in 
Minn-Chem, took issue with the Third Circuit’s characterization of the 
exclusion as an “import exception.”222  
The Seventh Circuit’s concern was proper for a number of reasons. 
First, the “exception” language of the Third Circuit223 implies that 
import commerce initially falls within the purview of the FTAIA but is 
subsequently removed by action of the statute. Such a treatment is 
incorrect. Congressional intent was to only include export, or at least 
transactions “other than import” trade, in the FTAIA’s general 
exclusionary rule.224 A private practitioner, testifying before the 
Judiciary Committee, noted that “it is important that . . . import 
restraints, which can be damaging to American consumers, remained 
covered by the [Sherman Act].”225 The legislative history makes clear 
through repetition that the FTAIA applies only to the “export business 
                                                                                                                     
conduct involving foreign entities and individuals. Id. (“Commerce with foreign nations, 
without doubt, means commerce between citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects 
of foreign governments, as individuals.”). 
 216. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 856. 
 217. Id.; see also Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“[W]hen there is conduct directed at reducing the competitiveness of a foreign market . . . such 
conduct involves foreign trade or commerce . . . .”). 
 218. Specifically, the import commerce exclusion focuses on whether the conduct 
“involv[es] . . . import commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 855 (labeling as the “import commerce exclusion”). 
 221. See 1 KINTNER TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.3, at 21 (“[I]f defendant’s conduct only 
involves import trade, that conduct remains subject to the  Sherman Act . . . .”). 
 222. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 223. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 224. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 10. 
 225. Id. at 9. 
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community.”226 Similarly, a strict construction of the import commerce 
exclusion is required to maintain a distinction between the domestic-
injury exception’s treatment of import commerce and the exclusion’s 
treatment. Therefore, conduct involving import commerce is never to 
reach an FTAIA inquiry and is more properly termed an exclusion than 
an exception.  
Interpreting the text of the parenthetical, one thing is clear: conduct 
must “involve” import commerce to be excluded from an FTAIA 
inquiry.227 This analysis—whether conduct involves import 
commerce—is different than the inquiry under prong one of the 
domestic-injury exception—whether the conduct has a “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect on import commerce.228 
A commonly cited definition of “import” states that the term “generally 
denotes a product (or perhaps a service) [that] has been brought into the 
United States from abroad.”229 Another oft-quoted authority provides 
that import commerce refers to “transactions in which the seller is 
located abroad while the buyer is domestic and the goods flow into the 
United States.”230 Both the Third and Second Circuits hint that conduct 
may need to be “directed at an import market” to sufficiently involve 
import commerce.231 Similarly, it is the conduct of the defendants, not 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Id. at 7. 
 227. See Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2002); Fond 
du Lac Bumper Exch., Inc. v. Jui Li Enter. Co., 795 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (E.D. Wis. 2011); In 
re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. MD 06-1775(JG)(VVP), 2008 WL 5958061, 
at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008). 
 228. See CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 539 (D.N.J. 2005) (citing Carpet  
Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 72 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Precision 
Assocs., Inc. v. Panalpina World Transp. (Holding) Ltd., No. 08-CV-42 (JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 
7053807, at *35–36 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2011) (“Two types of Sherman Act claims that implicate 
import trade or import commerce fall outside the scope of the FTAIA”: (1) conduct involving 
import commerce and (2) conduct that has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect” on import commerce). The import commerce exclusion requires that foreign conduct that 
involves import commerce be excluded from an FTAIA inquiry and subject to the Sherman Act. 
On the other hand, foreign conduct that does not involve import commerce, but nonetheless has 
a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on import commerce, falls within the 
domestic-injury exception, given that it also satisfies the second prong, and is still subject to the 
Sherman Act. 
 229. Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 303; see also WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1135 (3d ed. 1993) (defining “import” as 
“something . . . brought in from an outside source”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 823 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining “import” as a “product brought into a country from a foreign country where it 
originated”). 
 230. 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 272i, at 290 (3d ed. 2006). 
 231. See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 303 (quoting Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 
384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 
462, 470 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing the same proposition with approval). The same test can also be 
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the plaintiffs, that is scrutinized when determining whether the conduct 
involves import commerce.232 Generally speaking, conduct involving 
the flow of goods or services into the United States from abroad will be 
excluded from an FTAIA inquiry as a result of the parenthetical.233 
Should the conduct fall within the import commerce exclusion, U.S. 
antitrust laws may only apply if the complaint satisfies the common law 
tests derived from Alcoa and Hartford Fire.234 As discussed, this result 
seems peculiar, given that the FTAIA attempted to codify Alcoa.235 
Regardless, the weight of authority seems to be in favor of the 
continued application of the common law tests to conduct involving 
import commerce,236 and such an interpretation is necessary to ensure 
that conduct involving import commerce does not remain without a 
standard.  
Therefore, should a foreign actor engage in anticompetitive behavior 
involving the shipment of goods into the United States, the conduct will 
not be subject to an FTAIA inquiry. Rather, pursuant to the intended-
effects test from Alcoa, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct 
affected a United States market and that the foreign actor intended to do 
so. If successful, the issue may proceed to the merits of a Sherman Act 
claim. 
                                                                                                                     
worded as requiring that a defendant’s conduct “target import goods or services.” Id. On petition 
for writ of certiorari, the defendants in Minn-Chem meagerly attempted to articulate a circuit 
split between the interpretation of the Second and Third Circuits and that of the Seventh Circuit. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17–18, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., No. 12-650 (U.S. 
Nov. 23, 2012). As a requirement, such a standard—that conduct must be “directed at” import 
commerce to fall within the exclusion—would seem to blur the distinction between the import 
exclusion and the first prong of the domestic-injury exception. Indeed, both share the term 
“direct,” although used in different capacities. 
 232. Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 303 (citing Kruman, 284 F.3d at 395). 
 233. Fond du Lac Bumper Exch., Inc. v. Jui Li Enter. Co., 795 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849–51 
(E.D. Wis. 2011) (holding that the defendants’ conduct involved import commerce where 
defendants were Taiwanese manufacturers of “sheet metal aftermarket auto parts” and their 
“alleged conspiracy focused on setting the prices of parts that were manufactured for the 
purpose of being sold in the United States and that such parts were in fact sold in the United 
States,” regardless of whether defendants had transferred title of the parts abroad); Precision 
Assocs., 2011 WL 7053807, at *36 (holding that defendants’ alleged conduct involved import 
commerce where “[t]he freight forwarding service at issue . . . is the business of obtaining 
money for placing goods into the flow of commerce into and out of the United States”); cf. In re 
Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05634 CRB, 2011 WL 1753738, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2011) (holding that anticompetitive conduct in commercial air 
transportation did not involve import commerce: “[i]t is too great a leap to equate air passenger 
travel with the importing of people”); CSR Ltd., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 541–42 (holding that the 
defendants’ conduct did not involve import commerce for a multitude of reasons). 
 234. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 235. See supra note 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 182. 
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B.  Prong One of the Domestic-Injury Exception: Conduct and 
Effect 
Following the opening phrase, the first section of the FTAIA 
contains the first prong of the domestic-injury exception. Specifically, 
the statute provides that the Sherman Act does not apply to foreign, 
non-import conduct unless: 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect–(A) on trade or commerce which is not 
trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade 
or import commerce with foreign nations; or (B) on export 
trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States.237 
Much discussion has focused on the “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” language.238 The precise goal of the 
phrase is to “serve as a simple and straightforward clarification of 
existing American law and the Department of Justice enforcement 
standards.”239 Deemed the “domestic-injury exception,” the phrase 
adheres to Alcoa’s principle that “it is the situs of the effects as opposed 
to the conduct, that determines whether United States antitrust law 
applies.”240 Specifically, the language seeks to determine the “quantum 
and nature of the effects” required to apply U.S. antitrust laws to foreign 
conduct.241 
In breaking down the language of the first prong, interpretation of 
the term “direct” has resulted in a circuit split. As discussed above,242 
the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
term “direct” as relating to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
requiring that the domestic effect be an “immediate consequence” of the 
anticompetitive conduct.243 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation because the other wording of the statute serves 
to qualify the directness requirement.244 Instead, the Seventh Circuit 
relied on the Department of Justice’s interpretation and held that 
“direct” implied a proximate cause nexus.245 
                                                                                                                     
 237. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 238. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 5. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See supra Section II.C. 
 243. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 
Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., No. 12 Civ. 7465(SAS), 2013 WL 2099227, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013). 
 244. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 245. Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit’s confidence in the Department of Justice was 
well-grounded. The FTAIA’s legislative history approvingly cites 
authority from the Department of Justice on several occasions.246 
Furthermore, the legislative history refers to the “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement as a “single, objective 
test.”247 Therefore, “direct” should not be isolated, but rather should be 
read in conjunction with the entire phrase. When read together, the term 
“direct” clearly requires a proximate cause nexus between the foreign 
conduct and domestic effect.248 According to Justice Scalia, where 
“direct” is found within a statute to be unaccompanied by 
“substantiality” or “foreseeability” requirements, “direct” requires that 
an effect be an “immediate consequence” of the defendant’s conduct.249 
However, this is not the case within the FTAIA. In the first prong, 
“direct” is followed by requirements that the domestic effect be 
“substantial[] and reasonably foreseeable.”250 
As to the substantiality and foreseeability requirements, there is little 
guidance from the courts. However, the substantiality requirement may 
serve to incorporate additional factors, such as comity.251 Recall that 
before the enactment of the FTAIA, several courts of appeals applied a 
balancing test to determine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust 
laws.252 For example, the Ninth Circuit’s tripartite analysis required a 
balancing of “the relative significance of effects on the United States” 
with notions of international comity.253 It is within the term 
“substantial” where Empagran I’s revitalization of the comity factor 
may be found.254 Specifically, the term “substantial” implies a 
comparison. In that sense, the analysis may require that the domestic 
effect be “substantial” in relation to comity concerns to warrant 
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. 
The “reasonably foreseeable” provision replaces Alcoa’s 
                                                                                                                     
 246. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. 
 247. Id. at 2. 
 248. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (9th ed. 2009) (including immediacy in defining 
“direct”). 
 249. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992). 
 250. 15 U.S.C. §6a (2006). 
 251. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 
1976) (“[T]he requirement for a ‘substantial’ effect may silently incorporate [comity] 
considerations, with ‘substantial’ as a flexible standard that varies with other factors.”). 
 252. See supra Subsection I.A.2. (discussing the post-Alcoa balancing tests). 
 253. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. 
 254. In Empagran I, Justice Breyer did not find considerations of comity within the 
wording of the statute. 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). Rather, Justice Breyer held that comity 
considerations could be read into the statute by way of a canon of statutory construction. Id. 
(“[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with 
sovereign authority of other nations.”). 
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requirement of intent.255 Indeed, the condition is broader than a general 
intent standard and serves to avoid inquiries into defendants’ subjective 
intent.256 The objective nature operates “to promote certainty in 
assessing the applicability of American antitrust law.”257 Accordingly, 
“the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged domestic effect would have 
been evident to a reasonable person making practical business 
judgments.”258 
Having evaluated the “substantial” and “reasonably foreseeable” 
requirements, it is clear that those terms serve to qualify the directness 
wording. Therefore, the “immediate consequence” definition of direct, 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, is too narrow. As a result, the directness 
requirement moves down the causation spectrum to a slightly more 
attenuated standard—proximate cause. Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation is correct. In application, the first prong of the domestic-
injury exception of the FTAIA requires that a domestic effect be 
proximately related to the foreign conduct. 
Apart from the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” 
language at the beginning of the first prong, the section concludes by 
defining the relevant markets. Specifically, the effect must be:  
 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce 
with foreign nations [i.e., domestic trade or commerce], or 
on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; 
or  
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign 
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in 
the United States.259  
 
As noted above, the requirement that the foreign conduct have a “direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on “import trade or 
import commerce” is to be distinguished from the requirements of the 
import trade exclusion.260 
Another minor point of contention relates to market definition. 
Specifically, the question arises as to whether the “effect” on 
“commerce” requirement in the first prong necessitates an effect on the 
                                                                                                                     
 255. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9. 
 256. See id. (“The subcommittee chose a formulation based on foreseeability rather than 
intent to make the standard an objective one and to avoid . . . inquiries into the actual, subjective 
motives of defendants.”); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 
462, 471 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he FTAIA’s effects exception does not contain a ‘subjective intent’ 
requirement.”). 
 257. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9. 
 258. Animal Sci., 654 F.3d at 471. 
 259. 15 U.S.C. §6(a)(1) (2006). 
 260. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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broad market or merely an effect on the plaintiff.261 Several decisions 
require that the effect be on the market.262 However, in the case of a 
domestic plaintiff alleging domestic injury, some courts have found the 
plaintiff’s injury to suffice as the required domestic effect, blurring the 
distinction between the first and second prongs of the domestic-injury 
exception.263 Indeed, it seems simple enough for a domestic plaintiff to 
plead that any injury upon the plaintiff, as a market participant, is an 
effect upon the domestic market. 
C.  Prong Two of the Domestic-Injury Exception: Effect and Injury 
While the first prong lays out the requisite relationship between the 
conduct and effect, the second prong governs the relationship between 
the effect and injury. The distinction between conduct, effect, and injury 
becomes apparent in a factual scenario similar to that in Empagran I 
and II, with a foreign plaintiff alleging foreign conduct, domestic effect, 
and foreign injury.264 As to the wording of the statute, the second prong 
provides that the Sherman Act does not apply to non-import commerce 
with foreign nations unless the effect from prong one “gives rise to a 
claim under the provisions of” the Sherman Act.265 There is limited 
legislative history describing the language of the second prong. 
However, the legislative history does clarify that beneficial domestic 
effects are insufficient to satisfy the domestic-injury exception.266 
“[T]he domestic ‘effect’ that may serve as the predicate for antitrust 
jurisdiction under the bill must be of the type that the antitrust laws 
                                                                                                                     
 261. See McLafferty v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., 2009 WL 3365881, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
16, 2009) (addressing the plaintiff’s theory that the payment of supra-competitive prices in the 
United States for plane tickets between two foreign locations was a  sufficient effect on U.S. 
commerce under prong one of the FTAIA and holding that “[t]he fact that the supra-competitive 
prices were paid by persons in the United States does not establish, or even intimate, that the 
conspiracy directly effected United States commerce” (footnote omitted)). The issue arises 
where a domestic plaintiff contends that her injury suffices as the requisite domestic effect. Id. 
 262. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 476 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456 
(D. Del. 2007) (agreeing with the plaintiffs that the “appropriate focus . . . is the effect on 
commerce and not the effect on any particular plaintiff”); CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 
2d 526, 546 (D.N.J. 2005) (requiring a market effect in the United States). 
 263. See, e.g., SRAM, 2010 WL 5477313, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010) (holding that the 
plaintiffs’ purchase of “static random access memory” at supra-comeptitive prices in the U.S. 
was sufficient to satisfy prong one of the FTAIA). 
 264. Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004); Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 265. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2006). 
 266. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 11; see also Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 174 (2004) 
(explaining that Congress included the “gives rise to a claim” language “for a . . . neutral reason, 
namely, in order to make clear that the domestic effect must be an adverse (as opposed to a 
beneficial) effect”). 
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prohibit.”267 This much is clear from a facial reading of the second 
prong. 
The language of the second prong mentions “a claim.”268 It is even 
unclear whether the term “claim” within the second prong refers to the 
plaintiff’s injury. Indeed, as the Second Circuit noted, the Sherman Act 
does not speak to civil actions, and there is no mention of an injury 
requirement for a private plaintiff.269 Rather, the Clayton Act allows for 
a civil action by a private plaintiff where that person is “injured . . . by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”270 Therefore, private 
recovery under the Clayton Act is dependent upon violation of the 
Sherman Act, and it may not be unreasonable to read the second prong 
of the FTAIA as requiring that the domestic effect “gives rise to [the 
plaintiff’s injury].” That argument is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s 
reference to “injury” throughout its opinion in Empagran I.271 
Prior to the Court’s landmark decision in Empagran I, a circuit split 
had developed as to the proper interpretation of the second prong.272 
The Fifth Circuit strictly held that “the effect on United States 
commerce . . . must give rise to the claim that [the plaintiff] asserts 
against the defendants.”273 In contrast, the Second Circuit held that the 
second prong only requires that the domestic effect give rise to a claim 
under the Sherman Act, not necessarily the plaintiffs.274 The Court 
resolved the issue in favor of the Fifth Circuit’s approach, holding that 
“Congress would not have intended the FTAIA’s exception to bring 
                                                                                                                     
 267. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 11 (“The Committee did not believe that the bill 
reported by the Subcommittee was intended to confer jurisdiction on injured foreign persons 
when that injury arose from conduct with no anticompetitive effects in the domestic 
marketplace.”). 
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2). 
 269. Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 397 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 270. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (emphasis added). 
 271. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 175; see also Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La-Roche, Ltd., 
315 F.3d 338, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2003), (“[T]he language is far from clear as to whether [the 
‘gives rise to’] requirement can be satisfied merely by a violation of the Sherman Act, rather 
than by antitrust injury to the plaintiffs . . . [who] bring a claim under the provisions of the 
Clayton Act . . . .”) vacated, Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 272. See 1 KINTNER TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.3, at 22 (discussing the circuit split); see 
also Empagran S.A., 315 F.3d at 349 (“[B]oth the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit found the 
“gives rise to a claim” language of § 6a(2) to be plain in opposite ways . . . .”). 
 273. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 
2001). In other words, “the effect of the defendant’s conduct on the American market must give 
rise to the plaintiff’s specific claim.” 1 KINTNER TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.3, at 22 (emphasis 
added). 
 274. Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 352 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing 284 F.3d 384, 
400); see also Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp., 325 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(failing to determine the issue but noting that Seventh Circuit case law may favor the Second 
Circuit’s broader approach). 
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independently caused foreign injury within the Sherman Act’s reach.”275 
On remand, the D.C. Circuit was tasked with determining the 
required relationship between the “adverse domestic effect” and the 
plaintiffs’ “foreign injury.”276 The court rejected arguments in favor of a 
but-for nexus and held that the “gives rise to” language of the second 
prong requires a proximate cause relationship.277 The D.C. Circuit’s 
determination is notoriously void of justification.278 In fact, the court 
only briefly provided a comity explanation for its adoption of a 
“proximate cause standard.”279 Despite the lack of basis, a number of 
courts have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s proximate cause requirement for 
the second prong of the FTAIA.280 Additionally, some courts have 
adhered to timing requirements regarding effect and injury.281 At least 
one court has required that the plaintiff’s foreign injury occur 
subsequent to the domestic effect.282 In contrast, other courts are 
satisfied if the foreign injury occurs simultaneous to a domestic 
effect.283 
IV.  DETERMINING THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR PRONG TWO 
Having established that the use of “direct” within the first prong 
necessitates a proximate cause nexus and that many courts have 
required a proximate cause nexus for the “gives rise to” wording of the 
second prong, the prior question arises: Do both prongs of the domestic-
injury exception of the FTAIA require a proximate cause inquiry? 
In light of the Seventh Circuit’s determination in Minn-Chem, it 
would seem that the question must be answered in the negative. In fact, 
the Seventh’s Circuit’s decision further reveals the unsuitability of the 
D.C. Circuit’s holding as to the second prong in Empagran II. This Part 
proceeds by rejecting Empagran II’s proximate cause requirement for 
the second prong and proposes a different standard:but-for causation. 
A.  Proximate Causation Is an Incorrect Standard 
Admittedly, there does not seem to be anything inherently wrong 
                                                                                                                     
 275. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 173; see also 1 KINTNER TREATISE, supra note 74, § 7.3, at 
22 (“The Supreme Court reversed, largely endorsing the Fifth Circuit’s approach.”). 
 276. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 277. Id. at 1271. 
 278. See supra note 128. 
 279. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
 280. See supra note 130 (outlining Empagran II and its progeny). 
 281. See Bauer, supra note 25, at 18. 
 282. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (“[The] FTAIA imposes a two-step dance, first with one foot (the domestic effects) and 
then with the other (the foreign antitrust injury).”). 
 283. See In re Inter Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 562 (D. 
Del. 2006) (allowing for a simultaneous effect). 
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with requiring a direct cause relationship—proximate cause—at each 
step. In the case of a foreign plaintiff alleging foreign conduct, domestic 
effect, and foreign injury, the statute would provide that the Sherman 
Act does not apply to foreign conduct involving non-import commerce 
unless defendant’s foreign conduct proximately caused a domestic 
effect,284 and the domestic effect proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
foreign injury. 
Similarly, in the case of a domestic plaintiff alleging foreign conduct 
and a domestic effect that is the plaintiff’s domestic injury, the statute 
may read that the Sherman Act does not apply to foreign conduct 
involving non-import commerce unless the foreign conduct is 
proximately related to a domestic effect, which is also the plaintiff’s 
domestic injury. This analysis would depend on whether the court 
requires an effect on the market or whether an effect on a domestic 
plaintiff is sufficient. 285 
While simple enough to apply, such an interpretation seems to stray 
from congressional intent. Indeed, had Congress sought the same 
analysis at each step, there would be some degree of uniformity within 
the language. More significantly, the legislative history does not speak 
to a separate inquiry as to the relationship between the effect and the 
injury. In fact, the legislative history states that the “gives rise to” 
language of the second prong serves merely to ensure that the alleged 
domestic effect constitutes an adverse, as opposed to beneficial, 
effect.286 The Supreme Court in Empagran I noted this much.287 It 
would seem that the courts, especially Empagran II and its progeny, 
have afforded too much emphasis to the second prong. 
In Empagran II, the D.C. Circuit’s lack of basis in developing the 
proximate cause standard certainly does not weigh in its favor. In fact, 
the court seemed to have pulled the requirement from thin air.288 Courts 
that have followed the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation have failed to 
expand significantly upon the D.C. Circuit’s analysis. The Eighth 
Circuit wholly agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s proximate cause standard, 
justifying its reasoning on comity and the FTAIA’s language and 
history.289 The Ninth Circuit followed suit, adding that “the proximate 
                                                                                                                     
 284. For the purposes of analysis going forward, this Note ignores the other requirements 
of the first prong—substantiality and foreseeability. 
 285. See supra notes 261–63 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 287. 542 U.S. 155, 174 (2004) (determining that the second section of the FTAIA exists 
only for a “neutral reason”). 
 288. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 289. MSG, 477 F.3d 535, 539 (8th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit properly cites Empagran 
I for the proposition that the FTAIA sought to clarify, not expand, the reach of the Sherman Act. 
Id. Similarly, the court correctly noted that there is no relevant case law prior to the FTAIA 
where the Sherman Act applied to a foreign injury based on “indirect causation.” Id. The Eighth 
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cause standard is consistent with general antitrust principles, which 
typically require a direct causal link between the anticompetitive 
practice and the plaintiff’s damages.”290 Neither of these justifications is 
convincing, and both decisions fail to set forth a concrete basis for 
requiring a proximate cause relationship. 
Comity does not require such a strict standard of directness. 
Balancing the interests of the United States in regulating conduct that 
has a domestic effect with the risk of interference “with a foreign 
nation’s ability to independently regulate its own commercial affairs,” 
provides the common sense conclusion that plaintiffs alleging foreign 
injury independent of the domestic effect have no remedy in U.S. 
courts.291 However, courts should not go as far as to require proximate 
cause in the name of comity. Requiring such a hurdle for foreign 
plaintiffs experiencing foreign injury does little more than overburden 
potential plaintiffs that have a legitimate link to the United States. 
Providing redress in U.S. courts may even ease pressures on foreign 
sovereigns unable to provide sufficient remedies for harm that their 
citizens experience. Any objections by foreign sovereigns are to be 
taken in stride, as they will naturally object to any extraterritorial 
application of U.S. laws.  
Globalization of commerce requires a less stringent standard. In light 
of the practical dissolution of national borders in modern trade and 
commerce,292 distinctions between location of conduct, effect, and 
injury become less relevant. Particularly, proving a direct causal link 
between a domestic effect and a plaintiff’s injury is unnecessary. 
Rather, should a plaintiff sufficiently articulate a lesser nexus, a closer 
nexus may be presumed based on the interconnectedness of modern 
commerce.293 Requiring a plaintiff to articulate the complexities of a 
proximate cause relationship will prove unwarrantedly burdensome, 
especially in light of the increased probability of the existence of such a 
                                                                                                                     
Circuit faltered in its comparison of but-for causation and indirect causation. Id. While but-for 
causation is certainly less direct than proximate causation, it does not represent complete 
indirectness. A standard of complete indirectness, i.e., independence, was rejected by the Court 
in Empagran I. 542 U.S. at 164. Furthermore, as to be discussed, the language of the statute 
does not require such a level of directness. 
 290. DRAM, 546 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. 
Akzo Nobel Chem. B.V., 2005 WL 2207017, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (“[T]he proximate 
causation standard . . . is consistent with antitrust principles requiring that an antitrust injury-in-
fact be caused directly by a defendant’s conduct.”). 
 291. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 165. 
 292. See Goodno, supra note 34, at 1140 (“The world is becoming a smaller place. 
Technology and the internet have made global travel and communication easier, quicker, and 
more common.”). 
 293. While this argument may render the second prong irrelevant, it is argued above, supra 
notes 286–87, that courts have been reading into the second prong too much. Therefore, moving 
the second prong away from the spotlight may serve legislative intent.  
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relationship. 
While courts may desire a closer nexus to preserve judicial 
resources, considerable barriers to antitrust relief for foreign conduct 
already exist.  One of the most significant antitrust claims involving 
foreign conduct may now be subject to plausibility pleading 
requirements.294 Following the lead of the Third and Seventh Circuits, 
many other courts have held that the FTAIA raises a merits question, 
not a jurisdictional one.295 Following these decisions, a defendant must 
move to dismiss on FTAIA grounds under a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, as opposed to a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Such a result will raise the bar for 
pleading, keeping more plaintiffs out of court. While a plaintiff no 
longer has the burden of proving jurisdiction following a 12(b)(1) 
motion, defendants will rely on 12(b)(6), and a plaintiff’s complaint will 
be closely scrutinized, according to the Twombly and Iqbal pleading 
requirements.296 Filing a complaint with adequate facts may be nearly 
impossible without the benefit of discovery.297 
Admittedly, the inquiry into the relationship between the domestic 
effect and foreign injury becomes relevant only in the rare circumstance 
where a foreign plaintiff alleges foreign conduct, domestic effect, and 
foreign injury. However, the inquiry is relevant for those foreign 
plaintiffs seeking redress for conduct that affects the United States. 
Through examination, it becomes evident that requiring a proximate 
cause relationship between the domestic effect and a plaintiff’s injury is 
unnecessary and unduly burdensome. 
B.  But-For Causation Is the Correct Standard 
As the proximate cause standard appears incorrect, a different 
standard may be presented. The proper inquiry under the second prong 
of the FTAIA’s domestic-injury exception requires but-for causation. In 
application, the plaintiff’s foreign injury must have occurred but for a 
domestic effect in order for the Sherman Act to apply. A but-for 
requirement is proper for a number of reasons. 
The text of the FTAIA requires a but-for nexus. Recall that the 
Seventh Circuit determined that the term “direct” within the “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” phrase of the first prong 
requires a proximate cause requirement.298 When the phrase is read as a 
whole, the substantiality and foreseeability requirements serve to 
qualify the directness language. As such, the Seventh Circuit correctly 
                                                                                                                     
 294. See supra Section II.A. 
 295. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Bauer, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 298. See supra Section II.C. 
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determined that a proximate cause standard, as opposed to an even more 
stringent standard, was correct for the first prong.299 In comparison, 
there is no use of the word “direct” in the second prong. Unlike the 
directness requirement of the first prong, the “gives rise to” language of 
the second prong begins at the other end of the causation spectrum.300 
Indeed, the language of the second prong invokes notions of broad 
application, and there is no language within the statute bringing it closer 
to a more direct standard. Therefore, on first glance, the language of the 
second prong approaches but-for causation, or even a lesser standard.301 
Congressional intent indicates a but-for standard.302 Specifically, by 
adhering more closely to the text, a but-for requirement will provide for 
greater clarity.303 As noted above, had Congress intended a proximate 
cause standard to apply to the second prong, Congress would have 
provided for language similar to that of the first prong. The legislative 
history’s limited discussion on comity implies that the causal 
relationship between effect and injury may be minimal. 
A but-for requirement will provide for a sufficient degree of 
                                                                                                                     
 299. See supra Section III.B. 
 300. Corrected Brief for Appellants at 22–23, Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (No. 01-7115), 2005 WL 79117, at *22–23 (stating that “gives rise to” implies “but for” 
causation). 
 301. The Supreme Court rejected a de minimis-type standard when it held that 
“independently caused foreign injury” does not fall within the Sherman Act’s reach.  
Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004). Similarly, the Court has already stretched the meaning 
of the statute beyond the literal text, and it would seem unlikely that the Court would seek to 
further hone the statute toward a stricter standard. See id. at 174 (“It also makes linguistic sense 
to read the words ‘a claim’ as if they refer to the ‘plaintiff’s claim’ or ‘the claim at issue.’”). 
 302. As Empagran I makes clear, Congress did not seek to expand extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act by enacting the FTAIA. Id. at 169. Those disfavoring a but-for 
causation standard point out that no case law prior to the enactment of the FTAIA required a 
lesser standard, i.e., but-for causation, in analyzing the connection between domestic effect and 
foreign harm. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees in Response to Court Order of November 22, 2004 
at 14–16, Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 01-7115), 2005 WL 6488381, at 
*9, *14–16. Such arguments point out that but-for causation has never been sufficient to 
determine antitrust standing or the link between conduct and injury. Id. These arguments fail to 
account for the narrowed inquiry of the second prong of the domestic-injury exception. The 
inquiry of the second prong of the domestic-injury exception, i.e., the link between domestic 
effect and injury, cannot be compared to standing requirements or the general link between 
conduct and injury. In fact, the pre-FTAIA intended-effects test seemed to stop after the first 
prong of the domestic-injury exception. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding 
that the intended-effects test required that both foreign anticompetitive conduct have an effect 
on domestic commerce and that the defendant intended to affect domestic commerce). Such 
confusion may be further evidence that courts have afforded too much emphasis on the second 
prong of the domestic-injury exception. See supra Section IV.A. (noting that courts have 
afforded too much emphasis on the second prong of the domestic-injury exception). 
 303. Clarity was a primary goal in enacting the FTAIA. See supra note 80 and 
accompanying text. 
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objective foreseeability. It is not unreasonable for a foreign defendant to 
expect to be haled into a U.S. court for foreign injuries that occurred but 
for an adverse effect in the United States. In light of increasing 
globalization, foreign defendants can assume that should their conduct 
cause adverse domestic effects in the United States, they may be liable 
for injuries incurred abroad. 
But-for causation provides sufficient deference to foreign 
sovereigns. One must not forget that comity interests are already to be 
considered in the first prong of the domestic-injury exception,304 in 
linking the conduct to the effect.305 The United States undoubtedly has a 
significant interest in regulating conduct that affects domestic 
commerce. It logically follows that the United States has a strong 
interest in remedying injury that can be reasonably linked to that effect. 
Certainly, other nations cannot reasonably object to U.S. interference 
where a foreign injury results but for a domestic effect in the United 
States. Indeed, nations with similar effect requirements may be 
welcoming to U.S. redress where their citizens’ injuries cannot be 
linked to an effect within their own country. 
A but-for nexus does not encourage overbroad application of the 
Sherman Act. The FTAIA is only relevant to non-import commerce, 
and import commerce is still subject to the common law requirements 
under Alcoa and Hartford Fire for the Sherman Act to apply to foreign 
conduct.306 Similarly, some courts’ timing requirements effectively 
bolster the causal link between the effect and injury.307 
Lastly, a but-for causation requirement will serve to satisfy the goals 
of the Sherman Act. Among the many purposes of the Sherman Act, 
Congress sought to encourage competition and to protect consumers 
from injuries resulting from anticompetitive conduct.308 As 
compounded by the globalization of commerce, anticompetitive conduct 
can have broad and drastic effects on even the most localized 
consumers. Minimizing barriers to remedies, or at least removing 
unreasonable barriers, is directly in line with the goals of the Sherman 
Act. 
Therefore, but-for causation is the correct standard for the second 
prong of the FTAIA’s domestic-injury exception. Considerations of the 
                                                                                                                     
 304. See supra Section III.B. (arguing that the substantiality requirement in the first prong 
of the domestic-injury exception necessitates a comity analysis). 
 305. Even with any growth of foreign antitrust regimes, their interests may be limited to the 
relationship between conduct and effect. It would be unreasonable for foreign regimes to 
complain of U.S. redress where the anticompetitive conduct had an effect on U.S. markets. 
 306. See supra note 182. 
 307. See supra notes 281–87 and accompanying text. 
 308. See Fond du Lac Bumper Exch., Inc. v. Jui Li Enter. Co., 795 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 
(E.D. Wis. 2011) (“[T]he purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers and businesses in 
the American marketplace from injuries arising from anticompetitive activity.”). 
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FTAIA’s language and legislative history, among other factors, serve to 
substantiate a but-for causation requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of U.S. antitrust laws abroad has resulted in much 
confusion since the infancy of the Sherman Act. Initial cases that dealt 
with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act provided for a 
broad spectrum of dispositions. Similarly, the prevailing test for much 
of the twentieth century was deemed incomplete by several courts of 
appeals. Unfortunately, congressional intervention did little to resolve 
the confusion or provide clarity to parties, practitioners, and the courts. 
In fact, the FTAIA’s “rather convoluted language”309 has resulted in a 
multitude of disagreements as to interpretations of its provisions. 
Fortunately, a select few cases do provide some clarity and guidance 
as to the interpretation of the FTAIA. In one of those cases, Empagran 
I, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a relatively narrow issue, but 
nevertheless provided a great deal of insight as to other issues regarding 
the FTAIA. More recently, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Minn-Chem 
has afforded significant clarity as to several FTAIA issues. In doing so, 
the Seventh Circuit further revealed the inadequacy of a recent line of 
interpretations. 
Empagran II and its progeny provide that the second prong of the 
domestic-injury exception of the FTAIA requires a proximate cause 
relationship between prong one’s domestic effect and a plaintiff’s 
foreign injury. By sufficiently justifying a proximate cause relationship 
for the first prong of the domestic-injury exception, the Seventh Circuit 
unearthed Empagran II’s shortcomings. It quickly becomes evident that 
proximate cause is not the correct standard for the second prong of the 
domestic-injury exception. Rather, this Note argues that a but-for nexus 
more properly defines the requisite relationship between prong one’s 
domestic effect and plaintiff’s foreign injury. Therefore, courts should 
abandon Empagran II’s holding in favor of but-for causation. 
                                                                                                                     
 309. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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